There was an interesting article in the New Yorker last week written by Michael Specter. The article focuses on the killing of Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow in October of 2006. Politkovskaya was a journalist and outspoken critic of Russian policies in Chechnya, and was particularly critical of Putin’s leadership. Her death was noted widely in the Western press and in liberal circles within Russia. Despite a dramatic funeral in Moscow, however, Specter notes that few Russian media outlets covered her killing in any detail. Putin himself, when asked about her death at a press conference, dismissed her influence on Russian politics as “very minor.”
When you combine Politkovskaya’s murder with the poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko, and the public killing of Alexander Litvenenko in London, a grim pattern emerges. It’s no secret that Putin’s administration tolerates no dissent inside or outside the country. The Duma has greatly expanded the powers of the state in this regard, including a little-noticed bill passed last summer permitting the administration to “eliminate” enemies of the regime abroad. In fact, even before they had the authority, the FSB (the successor to the USSR’s KGB) has proved ruthless in its persecution of Putin’s enemies, both foreign and domestic.
Despite these measures (or because of them?) Putin continues to enjoy widespread support within Russia. Much of his domestic support can be attributed to his emphasis on stability and economic growth at the expense of political freedom. After the chaos of the 1990s in Russia, the population was ready and willing to trade rights like freedom of expression in exchange for a stable economy and a strong leadership. The second Chechnya campaign (whether or not it was instigated by Putin, as Politkovskaya claimed) was designed in part to compensate for the humiliating defeat suffered by the Russian Army in its first campaign in 1994. It enjoyed overwhelming support in the Russian public.
All of this has me thinking…is Putin’s model for Russia a preview of our own future in the West? Are we more alike than different?
Russia is certainly a special case in that the fall of the Soviet Union caused widespread social and political chaos. It would also be an exaggeration to say that the United States bears any resemblance to Putin’s Russia in the realm of individual rights. However, one can easily draw parallels between the reaction of the Russian public and the Putin administration to the threat of terrorism in the South Caucasus and the reaction of the Bush administration to the attacks of 9-11. What is remarkable is that in each case the public has accepted and rationalized the need for extreme measures curtailing their freedoms. These measures include: strengthening of executive power at the expense of legislative power and regional governments; encouraging friendly reporting and attacks on unfriendly press outlets, persecution of critics of the government, and manipulation of military campaigns for political gain.
Going even further, one can also see parallels between Putin and Bush’s respective visions of the economy and civil society. There is a belief in both administrations that if the population is consuming then it is stable. The voting public is essentially conservative in this regard, especially when faced with the threat of terrorism. Putin’s philosophy seems to be that the Russian public will trade social and political rights for steady work, good housing, a car and physical safety. He may be right. Echoes of this view are found in Bush’s response to 9-11, when he encouraged Americans to go shopping.
It’s also apparent that both men have a belief in the power of energy in foreign policy. Putin’s well-publicized attack on Yukos and Mikhail Khodorkovsky left his administration in control of one of the world’s most powerful energy conglomerates. (Many believe that Putin will leave office to run Gazprom.) Recently, Gazprom has flexed its muscles in disputes with Ukraine and Belarus over prices for natural gas. Meanwhile, despite the Bush administration’s rhetoric about democracy and terrorism, it’s clear that policies in Iraq are affected by its status as an oil producer and its proximity to other oil-rich countries. When Bush talks about the consequences of defeat in Iraq for the “region”, what does he mean? The “region” is the Middle East, of course. And the consequences of wider instability in the Middle East would include disruption of oil exports not only from Iraq, but also from Saudi Arabia.
The difference is that the institutions of the United States are strong enough to resist the efforts of Bush and Cheney to impose Putin-style reforms. However, when Bush got a “sense of Putin’s soul” during their meeting in June of 2001, perhaps he saw something he liked…and wanted to emulate.
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